45 S.W. 578
CROUCH 
v. 
STATE.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
April 13, 1898.
Page 579
        Appeal from Freestone county court; W. M. White, Judge.
        E. D. Crouch was convicted of obstructing a public road, and he appeals. Affirmed.
        Bell & Williford and Geo. A. Bell, for appellant. W. W. Walling and Mann Trice, for the State.
        HENDERSON, J.
        Appellant was convicted of obstructing a public road, and his punishment assessed at a fine of one 
dollar, and he appeals.
        There is no question as to the obstruction of the certain road named in the information. The only 
question is whether or not the same was a public road. The record shows a petition for a public road of the 
second class; and it shows notice to appellant, Crouch, and others whose lands were to be affected by 
said road; shows the appointment of a jury of review, appellant's claim before them for damages, their 
review and return of said writ, and refusal to allow any damages, and the appearance of the appellant, 
Crouch, before said commissioners' court when the final order was made laying out and making said road 
a public road of the third class. The proof shows that said road ran along the boundary line of appellant's 
survey, some 1,000 yards; and that, previous to being laid out and established as a public road, appellant 
had gates which were continued after the adoption of the road. It appears that said gates opened into the 
field of the appellant, and that they were left open, and that the certain gate in question was left open a 
number of times by one Bounds, who was also the overseer of said road, and that appellant thereupon 
fastened up said gate, wiring it, and the wires had to be broken before persons could enter the same. This 
was the obstruction complained of.
        Section 17 of our bill of rights provides that "no person's property shall be taken, damaged or 
destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made, unless by the consent 
of such person, and when taken, except for the use of the state, such compensation shall be first made or 
secured by a deposit of money," etc. Our statutes with regard to public roads provide the method of 
condemnation. See articles 4670 to 4715, inclusive, Rev. St. 1895. When a claim for damages is made by 
a person whose land is to be taken for the purpose of a public road, it is provided that the reviewers first 
assess the damage, which shall be referred to the commissioners' court, who may approve the same or 
assess other damages; and, in case "the owner of the land is not satisfied with the assessment by the 
commissioners' court, he may appeal therefrom as in cases of appeal from judgment of justice's court, but 
such appeal shall not prevent the road from being opened, but shall be only to fix the amount of damages. 
If no claim of damages is filed with such jury, after notice as provided in the preceding article, the same 
shall be considered as waived." See article 4693, Rev. St. 1895. Besides this remedy, appellant had the 
right, if the proceedings were illegal in the condemnation of his land for said public road, to enjoin the 
same, or sue the county for damages. Travis Co. v. Trogden, 88 Tex. 302, 31 S. W. 358.
        Unquestionably, the legislature had the right to create the commissioners' court a tribunal to 
condemn land for public roads, and to prescribe the procedure in regard thereto. See Black, Const. Law, § 
180. And appellant having appeared before said tribunal, if he was dissatisfied with the report of the 
reviewers and the judgment of the commissioners, he should have prosecuted his appeal, or he should 
have taken his legal redress through the courts by some other procedure. After the road was established, 
although no damages were allowed him by the reviewers or by the commissioners' court, he could not 
disregard their order, although the constitution provides that no citizen's land shall be taken by the state 
for public use without adequate compensation. He was entitled to compensation, but he should have 
prosecuted his rights before the courts. The order establishing the road was obligatory upon him, and he 
could not disregard it, and his obstruction by fastening up the gate with wire was an unlawful act on his 
part. We further hold that the fact of his fastening up said gate after he knew that it had been established 
as a public road of the third class was under the circumstances willful, and the proof offered by him that 
he had the advice of attorneys to the effect that the order was void would not avail him as tending to 
show that his act was not willfully done. The judgment is affirmed.